An unexpected connection on the professional network. An offer of employment from a headhunter, probably a young woman, operating from the Asian nation. The opportunity to make around £20,000 on the side preparing a small number of political analyses for a Chinese company peppered with “non-public” or “insider” insights. Payment in digital currency or cash preferred.
It may seem obvious, in this scenario, that something about this approach would be suspicious. Nevertheless, China’s powerful Ministry of State Security continues to view it worthwhile to use headhunters to try it – leading MI5 to warn repeatedly about their operations online.
Massive Approaches on Social Media
Last year, MI5 chief Ken McCallum said Chinese agents were contacting UK citizens on LinkedIn on an unprecedented level, at a rate of ten thousand over the previous 30-month period, seeking governmental, industrial, military and technological classified information. However a fresh initiative targeting elected officials and parliament has prompted the spy agency to act again.
An espionage warning was distributed on this week via the offices of the Commons speaker and his House of Lords equivalent: a single slide after the repeated efforts of Shirly Shen and Amanda Qiu to reach out to MPs, lords, their assistants, economists, research organizations – anybody who might become a source.
Security Approach and Legislative Updates
In the curious style of UK security services, there was no publication of the security advice from MI5 or the interior ministry. But the service was aware its advisory document would leak once it was emailed out to Westminster. Republishing it in the press assists the general population better identify interactions with a fraudulent purpose.
This warning has the effect of uncovering more information from within Westminster, though that is not MI5’s primary purpose. The service aims for public figures to understand that simply because interactions on LinkedIn are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it doesn't imply they are without risk.
Nor is domestic spy agency believed to have been reacting to a particular event in parliament, although the burst of activity does come after the embarrassing collapse of the legal case of a ex-assistant Christopher Cash and his associate another person on a technicality in recent months.
Both individuals had been accused of spying for the foreign power – a allegation they denied – but inability to complete a trial under the since replaced Official Secrets Act resulted in warnings that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Revised Laws and China's Long-Term Interests
Legislation has now been changed, and the security briefing contains a reminder of its replacement: “Those engaging in espionage activity risk substantial legal consequences under the National Security Act.” It is a criminal offense if somebody participates in behavior that could potentially “materially assist a overseas spy agency”.
A natural inquiry, however, is what Beijing has to gain. An elected representative who is outside ministerial roles will have limited knowledge of classified material, and an contact of theirs even less. But the Chinese government is also interested in the legislative body: for a period, in recent years, the UK’s approach to China on matters such as Huawei or the human rights situation or genocide was being driven by MPs.
Methodological Differences and Persistent Digital Threats
To a degree there are cultural differences too. Autocratic regimes like China’s export intelligence collection methods and the scale of its intelligence apparatus is enormous, employing 300,000 people. Chris Inglis, a US national cyber director under president Joe Biden, commented it was occasionally assessed that “China have more English speakers engaged in this than Western agencies have English speakers”.
Beijing is willing to develop people over the extended period and at times even the agencies have found it difficult to distinguish between genuine connections and espionage. “China has a low threshold for which details is deemed to be of value,” security minister Dan Jarvis told MPs on this week, but a sudden turn in the government situation may mean someone rapidly marginal turning significant.
Another way to think about the relentless efforts at covert intelligence collection is in the wider context of the international competition between Beijing and the west at a threshold below the point of outright war. China has increased its hacking efforts, with the Salt Typhoon penetration of communications systems in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon breach of countless connected equipment.
Beijing is involved in relentless attempts to find covert sources on British democracy via digital means because it seeks to be challenging, to display influence and because it has the capability.